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Abstract
This paper presents a model for the \gambling e®ect," i.e., the e®ect that
risky gambles are evaluated di®erently than riskless outcomes due to an intrinsic
utility (or disutility) of gambling. The model turns out to violate stochastic
dominance and therefore its primary applications will be descriptive. It sheds
new light on empirical observations of risk attitudes and provides new insights
into the distinction between risky and riskless utility.
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1 Introduction
Many authors have suggested a \gambling e®ect," i.e., the e®ect that people process
risky choice options in a di®erent manner than riskless ones. The e®ect may be due
to an intrinsic utility for the presence or absence of risk, and underlies much of the
commonly observed risk aversion (Royden, Suppes, & Walsh 1959). It may have
confounded many empirical investigations into risk attitudes (Conlisk 1993). The
e®ect was already mentioned by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944, pp. 28, 629,
632). For an extensive survey of the literature, with extensive empirical evidence,
see Conlisk (1993). Several historical citations are given by Pope (1995). Our paper
presents a decision theory for the gambling e®ect, generalizing and simplifying earlier
contributions by Fishburn (1980) and Schmidt (1998).
The gambling e®ect is intuitively appealing. It is psychologically plausible that
people, in the presence of risk, invoke di®erent evaluation methods than when no
risk is present. Surprisingly, only two papers have provided preference theories for
the gambling e®ect (Fishburn 1980, Schmidt 1998), to the best of our knowledge.1
An explanation may be that any decision model of the e®ect necessarily violates
stochastic dominance (see Observation 7). Such violations are normatively undesir-
able, hence the gambling e®ect is not interesting from a normative perspective. For
many years, systematic violations of stochastic dominance were also held to be de-
scriptively undesirable because they seem to be implausible. In addition, descriptive
models should satisfy some minimal rationality conditions in order to be tractable
and permit theoretical derivations. Stochastic dominance was usually considered to
be one of those rationality conditions.
1For decision under uncertainty, Luce & Marley 1999 give an alternative approach, based on a
di®erent paradigm for decision making.
3
The demonstrated violation of stochastic dominance allows for a new speculation
on a text in von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944): `. . . concepts like a \speci¯c utility
of gambling" cannot be formulated free of contradiction on this level. . . . But anybody
who has seriously tried to axiomatize that elusive concept, will probably concur with
it' (p. 28 including footnote 3). The present paper is the third which has seriously
tried to axiomatize the speci¯c utility of gambling. It does not seem impossible to
us that von Neumann & Morgenstern, when alluding to a \contradiction," foresaw a
violation of something as basic as stochastic dominance.2 Remarkably, also Tversky
(1967) is negative on the possibility to axiomatize the gambling e®ect (\In spite of
its apparent appeal, this approach does not yield testable predictions." p. 198).
In the last decades, more interest has arisen in basic violations of rationality. The
preference reversal e®ect (Lichtenstein & Slovic 1971, Lindman 1971) was a ¯rst signal
of rationality violations more basic than expected before. Framing e®ects (Tversky
& Kahneman 1981) provided another signal. Finally, Tversky & Kahneman (1986)
developed a clever example where violations of stochastic dominance can be generated
systematically. Starmer & Sugden (1993) formalized the underlying \event splitting
e®ect," further re¯ned and con¯rmed in several papers by Birnbaum and co-authors
(e.g., Birnbaum & Navarrete 1998). These ¯ndings, the psychological plausibility of
the gambling e®ect, and the interest in the phenomenon expressed by many, have led
to the present paper. Let us now turn to the impact of the gambling e®ect on risk
attitudes.
Under expected utility, a special preference for riskless outcomes is de¯ned as
risk aversion and modeled through a concave utility. Several generalizations have
2At other places, e.g., p. 632, von Neumann & Morgenstern suggest that reduction of compound
lotteries should be abandoned so as to accommodate for a utility of gambling. Our paper does not
consider compound gambles.
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been proposed during the last decades, such as the certainty e®ect of prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Here probabilities are transformed nonlinearly into
decision weights. The transformation function is assumed to decrease steeply at
certainty 1, leading to additional preference for riskless outcomes such as exhibited
in the Allais paradox and outside the realm of expected utility. Modern variations,
through rank-dependent expected utility (Quiggin 1981), cumulative prospect theory
(Luce 1991, Tversky & Kahneman 1992), and other models (Dekel 1986, Sugden 1993)
have been proposed. All these models have in common that the special preference
for riskless options is smooth, i.e., there is no qualitative di®erence between risky and
riskless options but a gradual one. If lotteries are risky but close to riskless then their
evaluation is also close to the riskless evaluation.
The gambling e®ect as modeled in this paper entails a more drastic form of the
certainty e®ect, where the transition of certainty to risk is abrupt and discontinuous.
Such a transition is psychologically plausible. As soon as a sure outcome is changed
into a risky gamble, no matter how small the risk is, people may leave their \riskless"
evaluation process and turn to their \risky" evaluation process instead. The gambling
e®ect describes, in a way, a minimal deviation from expected utility to accommodate
the Allais paradox. As long as no riskless options are involved, expected utility can be
completely well satis¯ed. Only when riskless options are involved, a deviation from
expected utility is required.
Many empirical investigations have suggested that violations of expected utility
are primarily due to \boundary" e®ects, i.e., drastic changes in the evaluation process
when the number of positive-probability outcomes is changed (Conlisk 1989, Sopher
& Gigliotti 1993, Harless & Camerer 1994). Formal models describing such changes
in evaluation have been proposed by Viscusi (1989), Luce (1999), Neilson (1992),
and Humphrey (1998). In fact, already the often-discussed violation of stochastic
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dominance by original prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) was due to a
similar e®ect. The gambling e®ect model formalizes the simplest and most prominent
form of a boundary e®ect.
Di®erent evaluations for risky and riskless options have been proposed in other
contexts. For instance, Dyer & Sarin (1982), and many other papers (see the refer-
ences in Wakker 1994, Section 2), have proposed that expected utility with a utility
function u be used for risky choices, but a di®erent function v, a value function, be
used for riskless evaluations. Examples of riskless evaluations are intertemporal, wel-
fare, or strength of preference judgments. This distinction between utility and value
has been widely accepted (Dyer & Sarin 1982), although some authors have suggested
modi¯cations (Wakker 1994, Stalmeier & Bezembinder 1998). Our model takes the
di®erence between risky and riskless evaluations one step further than the Dyer &
Sarin model. For a preference between a riskless outcome x and a risky lottery P ,
the Dyer & Sarin model assumes that both x and P be evaluated through u and its
expectation. Our model proposes that already in the choice between x and P , the
value of x be v(x) and not u(x). Hence the Dyer & Sarin model is within the realm
of expected utility but our model deviates from expected utility. Another deviation
is that, contrary to the Dyer & Sarin model, we need not require that u and v order
outcomes in the same manner.
2 Basic Ways to Model the Gambling E®ect
In general, the gambling e®ect means that a preference x < P between a sure outcome
x and a risky lottery P holds if and only if the following formula holds:
W (x) ¸ W (P )¡ C(x; P ): (1)
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W is a preference functional from some risk theory |it will be expected utility in this
paper. C does not refer to an intrinsic value of x or P but instead describes a holistic
cost for the presence or absence of gambling. Costs of gambling may contribute to
risk aversion and insurance. Negative costs, so a positive utility of gambling, may
underly public lotteries, horse race betting, and casinos.
Without further restrictions, the model does not have any implication for prefer-
ence and even permits intransitivities. For instance, we can set C(x; P ) + W (x) ¡
W (P ) equal to 1 whenever x is preferred to P , equal to 0 whenever x is indi®erent
to P , and equal to ¡1 whenever P is preferred to x, thus accommodating any ar-
bitrary preference relation. Hence, to generate empirically meaningful predictions,
restrictions must be imposed on C.
Two approaches have been considered to ensure transitivity and extend the model
to other choices than between a risky and a riskless gamble. In the ¯rst approach,
C depends only on P , in the second C depends only on x. In the ¯rst approach the
costs can be written as C(P ). Then transitivity is satis¯ed, with W (P )¡ C(P ) the
value of the gamble and C the holistic cost of gambling. In the second approach, the
costs can be written as C(x). Transitivity is satis¯ed with W (x) +C(x) the value of
the riskless outcome and C the bene¯t of certainty. At the end of Section 6, we will
demonstrate that the second approach can always be rewritten as a special case of
the ¯rst approach, with C(P ) linear in P .
As common in the literature on the gambling e®ect, we assume that preferences
between risky lotteries agree with expected utility. Hence the only deviation from
expected utility considered is due to the gambling e®ect. Generalizations permitting
also other deviations are left to future studies. A ¯rst suggestion was made by Tversky
(1967). He considered a domain of gambles with one nonzero outcome and permitted
nonlinear probability transformation there.
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In the ¯rst approach, the model is too general if C can depend on the gamble P in
any possible manner. Then, irrespective of W , the model can accommodate almost
any transitive relation by taking C accordingly. Therefore Fishburn (1980), the only
decision-theoretic work on the ¯rst approach that we are aware of, added further
restrictions. These, however, turn out to imply that his model becomes a special case
of the second approach. A detailed discussion is given in Section 3. Observation 7,
demonstrating violation of stochastic dominance for the second approach, therefore
also applies to Fishburn's model.
Our paper is based on the second approach. Risky gambles P will be evaluated
by expected utility with respect to a \von Neumann-Morgenstern" utility function u.
Riskless outcomes x are evaluated by a \riskless" function v(x) (equal toW (x)+C(x)
in the notation of Eq. 1). The model could have a normative interpretation as a model
of transaction costs. For instance, if a sure outcome x could be collected right away
but for any risky gamble a contract would have to be signed to settle conditional
agreements, then C could designate the cost of the contract. An alternative example
can be as follows. The outcome of any risky gamble could be collected only after the
resolution of some uncertainty and be subjected to tax depending on that outcome,
but a sure outcome x could be collected beforehand evading the tax. It can then be
convenient to incorporate the tax saved under x not in the description of the outcome
x, but in the function C.
3 Related Literature
This section discusses related works on the gambling e®ect in some detail. We ¯rst
discuss the decision-theoretic models by Fishburn (1980), Schmidt (1998), and Luce
& Marley (1999). The ¯rst approach described in the preceding section, i.e., Eq.
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(1) with C depending only on P , was the starting point in Fishburn (1980). To
obtain predictive power, Fishburn added further restrictions. We ¯rst discuss his
central representation, Theorem 3. Fishburn assumed that not only W ¡ C, but
also W in isolation, represents preferences over risky gambles. This implies that
C is a transform of W , i.e., the cost of gambling depends only on the preference
value of the lottery and not on other characteristics. Further, the risky and riskless
functionals order outcomes in the same manner, andW is assumed to be an expected
utility functional. These assumptions also underlie the \fragmented" (Fishburn 1980,
p. 441) representations in Fishburn's Theorems 1 and 2 and in his other theorems.
Under these assumptions, Fishburn's model can be rewritten as a special case of the
second approach with C depending on the outcome x. It is a special case because
both W and W ¡ C represent preferences over risky lotteries, implying that v and u
order outcomes in the same manner.3
The second approach, with C depending only on x, has been suggested by Tversky
(1967) and Fishburn (1980) and was formalized by Schmidt (1998), a work written
independently of Fishburn (1980). Schmidt used the term \certainty e®ect" instead
of our general term gambling e®ect. We generalize Schmidt's (1998) approach by
permitting general outcomes as did Fishburn. Schmidt assumed a separable metric
outcome space and imposed continuity and boundedness conditions. Thus, his work
does not provide a genuine generalization of the von Neumann Morgenstern expected
utility model.
Luce & Marley (1999) consider decision under uncertainty instead of risk. Un-
3In the notation of Fishburn's Theorem 3, both u and u+Á order preferences over risky lotteries.
Hence we can de¯ne a strictly increasing transformation f such that f(u + Á) = u. Applying f
to Fishburn's representation u + Á yields the expected utility representation for lotteries, and for
outcomes x, f transforms (u + Á) into what we call v.
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certainty is described through events for which no probabilities need be given. Their
model can be considered a special case of the ¯rst approach to Eq. (1) with the cost
C(x; P ) depending on P only through the uncertain events used to describe P and
not through the outcomes (with their \kernel equivalent" playing the role of our W ).
Their approach deviates from the common decision paradigm in several respects, e.g.
through \joint receipts" (receiving more than one act simultaneously) and acts not
being identi¯ed with mappings from states to outcomes.
We next discuss some works that formulated version of the gambling e®ect but did
not provide preference axioms. Tversky (1967) explicitly pointed out that discrep-
ancies between risky and riskless utilities can be a®ected by the gambling e®ect. He
considered single nonzero outcomes and the logarithm of von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility. Nonlinear probability weighting was permitted. Tversky did not elaborate on
his interpretations and experimental measurements formally, and did not explicate
their similarities and di®erences with Savage's (1954) expected utility versus Edwards'
(1962) risk model. Hence his model is not discussed further.
Conlisk (1993) considered the ¯rst approach (C depends on P ), for two-outcome
gambles with expectation zero. He assumed that C is negative (so gambling is val-
ued positively) but remains small, so that it can a®ect gambles for small outcomes
but not for large outcomes. This model can explain risk seeking for small-outcome
gambles. Empirical evidence was presented. Conlisk derived plausible implications
from assumptions such as concavity on C and the other functions. This also suggests
that gambles with real incentives, as commonly adopted in experimental economics,
may be confounded by the gambling e®ect. Note that the Allais paradox cannot be
explained by Conlisk's model because C is negative (Conlisk 1993 end of Section 5).
Section 5 also demonstrates that decreasing proportional risk aversion, often observed
empirically, may be explained by a gambling e®ect.
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Neilson (1992) and Humphrey (1998) considered models where for each natu-
ral number n, a utility function un is given, and gambles with exactly n positive-
probability outcomes are evaluated by expected utility with respect to un. They gave
empirical evidence supporting such models. The gambling e®ect model studied in
the present paper can be considered the special case of the Neilson-Humphrey model
where only u1 deviates from the other utilities and all ujs for j ¸ 2 are identical.
This special case does cover the main cause for boundary e®ects, i.e., the certainty
e®ect. Our paper can be interpreted as a theoretical foundation for the simplest case
of the Neilson-Humphrey model.
Another general model is presented by Le Menestrel (1999), where the evaluation
of a gamble can depend on the process generating the gamble (see also Grant, Kajii,
& Polak 1998). Le Menestrel shows that the gambling e®ect is a special case of his
general model and demonstrates that this special case can have empirical implications.
For health outcomes, Richardson (1990) considered two-outcome gambles and as-
sumed that C consists of a constant utility of gambling plus a term depending on
the sure outcome x. Other references from health economics are Bombardier et al.
(1982), Gafni & Torrance (1984), Loomes (1993), Stiggelbout et al. (1994). In the
health domain, Gafni and colleagues argued for a systematic di®erence between risky
and riskless options (Mehrez & Gafni 1989, Gafni & Birch 1997). Their theoretical
derivations, unfortunately, turned out to be incorrect (Johannesson, Pliskin, & We-
instein 1993, Wakker 1996). The intuition underlying their approach is valuable and
the present paper may help formalize that intuition.
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4 Theory
Like the other papers on the gambling e®ect, we restrict attention to decision under
risk with given probabilities, hence we use the term lottery instead of the term gamble.
A lottery (p1; x1; : : : ; pn; xn) yields outcome xj with probability pj, j = 1; : : : ; n.
Probabilities are nonnegative and sum to one. C denotes the set of all conceivable
outcomes and L the set of all lotteries. We do not impose any condition on C and it can
be any arbitrary set, such as health states, commodity bundles, or monetary rewards.
L contains all ¯nite probability distributions over C. That is, every lottery is assumed
to take only ¯nitely many outcomes. Any lottery can be written as (p1; x1; : : : ; pn; xn)
for a ¯nite n. Preferences over lotteries are denoted by <, with Â (strict preference)
and » (indi®erence) as usual.
Throughout, any outcome x is identi¯ed with the corresponding riskless lottery
(1; x). The set of all riskless (\Safe") lotteries is identi¯ed with the outcome set C.
The set of the remaining, risky, lotteries, L ¡ S, is denoted by R. This set contains
all lotteries (p1; x1; : : : ; pn; xn) with n ¸ 2 and xi 6= xj for some i; j with pi > 0 and
pj > 0.
An evaluation or representation V is a function on the lotteries that determines
preference, i.e., P < Q if and only if V (P ) ¸ V (Q).
DEFINITION 1 The gambling e®ect model holds if there exists a utility function
u : C ! IR, a cost function c : C ! IR, a value function v = u ¡ c, and an
evaluation V that assigns to each risky lottery (p1; x1; : : : ; pn; xn) its u expectation
p1u(x1) + ¢ ¢ ¢+ pnu(xn), and v(x) to each outcome x. ¤
At this moment we do not yet impose any restriction on the relations between
v and u. These functions may order riskless outcomes di®erently. This issue is
further discussed in the following section. We study preference conditions for the
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above model. Weak ordering means that < is complete (P < Q or Q < P for all
lotteries P;Q) and transitive. For the independence condition we consider mixtures
of lotteries. For lotteries P and Q and 0  ¸  1, ¸P + (1 ¡ ¸)Q is the lottery
assigning probability ¸P (x) + (1¡ ¸)Q(x) to each outcome x. Here P and Q can be
risky or riskless. The main weakening of expected utility is that independence is now
imposed only on the risky lotteries, as in Fishburn (1980) and Schmidt (1998).
DEFINITION 2 Gambling independence holds if
P Â Q implies ¸P + (1¡ ¸)R Â ¸Q+ (1¡ ¸)R
for all risky P;Q;R and 0 < ¸ < 1.
This axiom provides the most straightforward modi¯cation of expected utility to
accommodate the Allais paradox. One simply adheres to expected utility except when
the certainty e®ect can play a role. Burks (1977) suggested this approach normatively.
He favored satisfying expected utility except in choice situations like Allais' paradox,
where he preferred deviating from expected utility. His viewpoint is similar to the
model characterized next. Observation 7 will demonstrate that Burks' approach faces
its own normative problems.
To obtain real-valued evaluations, Archimedean axioms have to be imposed. These
are usually somewhat complex and are \technical," i.e., have no direct empirical
content. Hence the following axiom can be skipped by readers not interested in
mathematical details. In our model the Archimedean axiom is more complicated
than under expected utility because the riskless lotteries have to be treated separately.
Our axiom generalizes Fishburn's (1980) Archimedean axioms. In Schmidt (1998), the
Archimedean axiom is implied by topological assumptions. Condition (i) in De¯nition
3 restricts the traditional Archimedean axiom of expected utility to the case of risky
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P;R so as to mix only risky lotteries. It covers the \regular" outcomes, i.e., outcomes
that are not superior or inferior to all lotteries. Additional conditions have to be
formulated for the \nonregular" outcomes that are preferred or dispreferred to all
lotteries. These conditions are speci¯ed in (ii) and (iii).
DEFINITION 3 The Archimedean Axiom holds if:
(i) For all lotteries Q and risky lotteries P;R, if P Â Q Â R then ¸R+(1¡¸)P Â
Q and Q Â ¹P + (1¡ ¹)R for some 0 < ¸ < 1 and 0 < ¹ < 1.
(ii) If, for some outcome x, x Â S (x Á S) for all risky lotteries S, then ¹ (¸) in
(i) can be chosen independently of P (Q).
(iii) There exists a countable subset D of outcomes that is \order-dense" in the
sense that, for every preference x Â y, x < d < y for some d 2 D.
¤
It can be veri¯ed that all conditions formulated above are necessary for the gam-
bling e®ect model. They are also su±cient, as the following theorem shows.
THEOREM 4 Let < be a preference relation on the set L of all ¯nite probability
distributions over a set C. Then preferences are evaluated by a gambling e®ect model
if and only if < satis¯es (i) weak ordering, (ii) gambling independence, and (iii) the
Archimedean axiom. ¤
Proofs are presented in the appendix. The uniqueness in the theorem is standard
but is somewhat complex to formulate due to the di®erent functions and their inter-
actions. In short, u is unique up to scale and location and v shares the same scale
and location except for outcomes that are preferred or dispreferred to all lotteries.
For the latter, v is ordinal. Details are as follows.
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OBSERVATION 5 The uniqueness results for Theorem 4 are as follows. Assuming
that u is replaced by another function u¤, we have:
(i) There exist a real ¿ and a positive ¾ such that u¤ = ¿ + ¾ £ u (u is unique
up to scale and location).
(ii) Given ¿ and ¾ as in (i), v is replaced by v¤ = ¿ + ¾ £ v for all outcomes
indi®erent to some lottery.
(iii) If outcomes exist that are preferred to all lotteries then v is ordinal there,
i.e., it can be replaced by v¤ if and only if v¤ exceeds all expectations of u¤ and
further v¤ is a strictly increasing transform of v.
(iv) If outcomes exist that are dispreferred to all lotteries then v is ordinal there,
i.e., it can be replaced by v¤ if and only if v¤ is exceeded by all expectations of
u¤ and further v¤ is a strictly increasing transform of v.
(v) c¤ is de¯ned accordingly, as v¤ ¡ u¤.
¤
It is remarkable that, outside the outcomes preferred or dispreferred to all lotteries,
v is also cardinal (unique up to scale and location) so that diminishing marginal value
can be de¯ned and empirically veri¯ed. It can be distinguished from diminishing
marginal utility in terms of u.
5 Stochastic Dominance
The analysis in the preceding section has not imposed any restriction on the relations
between v and u. This section studies the case where u and v order outcomes in the
same manner. This is called ordinal equivalence, and is formally de¯ned as u(x) ¸
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u(y) if and only if v(x) ¸ v(y). It is well-known that ordinal equivalence holds
if and only if u(x) = f(v(x)) for a strictly increasing function f . The condition
is natural for monetary outcomes, with higher amounts preferred to lower amounts
both under v and u, and was assumed by Fishburn (1980). For general outcomes,
e.g., multiattribute outcomes or commodity bundles, the condition is not self-evident
because the tradeo®s made between commodities may be di®erent under risk than
under certainty.
An example from health economics is as follows. Assume a two-attribute setting
of chronic health states. One dimension designates duration, the other state of health.
Assume that x = (25; B), designating 25 years of life while being blind, followed by
death. In the time tradeo® method for measuring value, introduced by Torrance,
Thomas, & Sackett (1972), subjects are asked how many years of life they would be
willing to sacri¯ce, hypothetically, to obtain full health. Say the subject says ¯ve
years, meaning that x » y with y = (20; H), 20 years in perfect health followed
by death. The subject may use an ordinally di®erent evaluation system for risky
decisions. Due to the gambling e®ect, a medical treatment that with some probability
results in (25; B) need not be indi®erent to another treatment that results in the
same probability distribution with, however, outcome (25; B) replaced by outcome
(20; H). Such phenomena are well-known in health economics and have led Gafni
and colleagues to develop the healthy years equivalent method.
In the absence of ordinal equivalence, there is no natural way to impose or even
de¯ne stochastic dominance. We now turn to a preference condition that does ensure
ordinal equivalence and next discuss stochastic dominance. Gamble monotonicity
holds if replacement of an outcome by a preferred outcome always leads to a preferred
lottery, assuming that both lotteries are risky. Formally, for all 0 < ¸ < 1 and for all
outcomes x; y and risky lotteries P , x < y if and only if ¸x+(1¡¸)P < ¸y+(1¡¸)P .
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This is similar to Fishburn's (1980) Axiom A2a. Note the restriction to risky lotteries
P , which serves to avoid confouding with the gambling e®ect.
OBSERVATION 6 Assume the gambling e®ect model. Ordinal equivalence of u and
v holds if and only if gamble monotonicity holds. ¤
Under ordinal equivalence the riskless ordering of outcomes is relevant to risky
choice, and stochastic dominance becomes meaningful. In our model, it is trivially
satis¯ed for risky lotteries because there expected utility holds. For riskless lotteries,
however, the condition becomes non-trivial due to the gambling e®ect. The formula-
tion of the condition chosen here highlights the relations and di®erences with ordinal
equivalence. Let us emphasize that the following formulation of stochastic domi-
nance is logically equivalent, on our domain L of ¯nite probability distributions, to
traditional formulations in terms of pointwise dominance of distribution functions.
Stochastic dominance holds if, for all outcomes x; y, 0 < ¸ < 1, and lotteries P ,
x < y implies ¸x + (1 ¡ ¸)P < ¸y + (1 ¡ ¸)P . The gambling e®ect model cannot
satisfy this condition unless it reduces to expected utility. This was demonstrated for
monetary outcomes and continuous nondecreasing u by Schmidt (1998, Proposition
1). We extend his result to the general gambling e®ect model.
OBSERVATION 7 Under the gambling e®ect model, stochastic dominance holds if
and only if expected utility is satis¯ed (i.e., v = u can be chosen). ¤
Assuming that stochastic dominance is normatively desirable, the result shows
that the gambling e®ect model is not normative. The interest of the model is descrip-
tive and lies in its psychological plausibility.
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6 Applications
In this section we assume the gambling e®ect model. We discuss the empirical mea-
surement of its primitives and some restrictions.
Eliciting u and v from preferences
In the trivial case where all risky lotteries are indi®erent, u(x) is 0 for all outcomes
x. We assume henceforth that not all lotteries are indi®erent so that u is not constant.
We take two arbitrary outcomes M and m such that u(M) > u(m) and normalize
u(M) = 1 and u(m) = 0. For instance, M may be a maximally and m a minimally
conceivable monetary reward, or, in the health domain, M may be perfect health and
m immediate death. Here are some ways for measuring u.
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Obviously, these are all methods for measuring traditional von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions without invoking riskless options. McCord & de Neufville (1986) have
argued for such measurements, precisely to avoid the certainty e®ect. Before, David-
son & Suppes (1956, p. 266) and Davidson, Suppes, & Siegel (1957, p. 18) also argued
for such measurements with the explicit purpose to avoid or reduce distortions due
to a speci¯c taste or distaste for gambling. The gambling e®ect model provides a
formal argument in favor of these proposals. Next we turn to the measurement of v.
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If x » P for a risky lottery P with expected utility ¹, then v(x) = ¹. Hence we get:
If u(M) > v(x) > u(m), then we can ¯nd v(x) = ¹ from a traditional \standard
gamble" indi®erence x » (¹;M ; 1¡ ¹;m).
If there are outcomes x strictly preferred to each lottery, then u is bounded (see
the proof of Theorem 4 in the appendix). On this set of strictly preferred outcomes x,
the function v is only ordinally determined as long as it exceeds all u values. Similarly,
for outcomes x strictly dispreferred to all risky lotteries, v is ordinally determined as
long as it is below all u values.
A useful feature, distinguishing the gambling e®ect model from other models sep-
arating between risky and riskless utility, is that v can be directly revealed from
risky choices, that is, from indi®erences between risky and riskless options. It has
been found empirically that measurements comparing risky to riskless options ob-
tain more concave utility functions than measurements that only invoke risky options
(McCord & de Neufville 1986, Wakker & Dene®e 1996). That may partly be due to
the gambling e®ect, i.e., to an intrinsic cost of risk.
Constant gambling e®ect
The utility measurements can reveal special properties of u and v, and can be
used to characterize them. One special case of interest concerns a constant cost
function c. Then there is a ¯xed cost c for resorting to risk attitude and this cost
is incurred whenever risk is perceived. The cost is independent of what the precise
risk is. Riskless outcomes x are valued by v(x), risky lotteries are evaluated by the
expected utility of the function u(x) = v(x)¡c. The utility measurement techniques,
described in the preceding section, can reveal such a constant cost function.
19
Alternatively, the case can be identi¯ed through direct preference conditions. This
was done by Fishburn (1980, Theorem 4). We adapt his condition to our context.
First assume that x » P and y » Q for outcomes x; y and risky lotteries P;Q.








P . Both mixtures are risky hence are
evaluated by expected utility. It can be seen that the evaluation of each comprises
half times: v(x) plus v(y) plus the cost c. Hence the mixtures must be indi®erent.
This leads to the following characterization, where we assume an indi®erence to avoid
triviality and some pathological cases.
THEOREM 8 Assume the gambling e®ect model and assume that y » Q for an
outcome y and a risky lottery Q. Then the cost function c = v¡ u is constant if and
only if the following conditions hold (hereafter, x and y are outcomes and P and Q
are risky lotteries).
(i) Gamble monotonicity.






























Intransitivity instead of violation of stochastic dominance
Imagine a choice between a sure outcome x and a risky lottery P , such that each
outcome of P is strictly preferred to x, but the gambling e®ect model assigns a higher
value to x. As shown in Observation 7, such violations of stochastic dominance or
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reversed violations with a preference for a dominated gamble, exist. Will a subject,
directly having to choose from these two options, really forego a lottery that can only
bring better outcomes? The answer depends on the context. The empirical ¯ndings of
violation of stochastic dominance cited in the introduction, always concern framings
of problems in which the stochastic dominance does not come out clearly and subjects
do not realize it. Another reason for the gambling e®ect can lie in transaction costs;
examples were given in Section 2. Alternatively, the subject may want to lay down
his future plans and then forget about it, and simply does not even want to think
about possible future pro¯ts if they are uncertain and small. Whenever there are
such concrete reasons at the background of the cost function, it seems plausible that
indeed the sure outcome x is chosen and stochastic dominance, de¯ned in a narrow
sense, is violated.
The case is di®erent when the gambling e®ect is due to irrationalities and simplistic
decision heuristics. When there is a clear dominance, it is plausible that subjects
go by that dominance and their behavior is not described by the gambling e®ect
model. Only if there is no clear dominance then subjects' behavior is described by the
gambling e®ect model. Subjects do not realize that their evaluation entails indirect
violations of monotonicity. They may prefer x to some lottery Q and Q to P whereas
P dominates x. Such \editing" (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) entails violations of
transitivity but constitutes an empirically plausible variation of the gambling e®ect
model.
Certainty Preference
An interesting special case is the case where c(x) ¸ 0 for all outcomes x, i.e.,
the cost of gambling is always nonnegative and there is a preference for certainty.
Schmidt (1998) characterized this special case by the following preference condition:
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For all risky lotteries P;Q, outcomes x, and 0 < ¸ < 1, if ¸x + (1 ¡ ¸)Q »
¸P + (1¡ ¸)Q, then x < P .
The proof that this condition is necessary and su±cient for nonnegative costs of
gambling follows from substitution and is not elaborated here (see Schmidt 1998,
Corollary 2).
A linear cost of gambling
We assumed in this paper the special case of Eq. 1 with C depending only on the
sure outcome x. This can be rewritten, given the assumption throughout that W
is expected utility, as a special case of dependency of C on the lottery P . To this
e®ect, let W ¤ be expected utility with respect to v instead of u, and for each lottery
P de¯ne C¤(P ) as the expectation of v¡ u. With these substitutions, W ¤(x) = v(x)
for all x andW ¤(P )¡C¤(P ) = W (P ) for all P , so that the representation is identical
to the original one. Conversely, every case of Eq. 1 with C depending on P in a
linear manner can, by inverse substitutions, be carried into a case of Eq. 1 with costs
depending only on x.
7 Conclusion
Throughout the history of risky choice, researchers have been aware of the gambling
e®ect, indicating that people use a di®erent method for evaluating riskless options
than for evaluating risky options. Theoretical models for the e®ect are almost absent,
probably due to the holistic nature of the gambling e®ect and the entailed violation
of stochastic dominance. Only recently, decision scientists have developed an interest
in such basic violations of rationality conditions as stochastic dominance.
The model studied in this paper provides a tractable theoretical basis for the
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gambling e®ect and describes, in a way, the most e±cient deviation from expected
utility to explain the Allais paradox. Tractable methods for the measurement of
its primitives have been presented, in particular for measuring riskless utility at a
cardinal level. The model sheds new light on risk aversion and its applications to
gambling, insurance, and other contexts. It seems plausible that many investigations
into risk attitudes have been confounded by the gambling e®ect.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4 and Observation 5. We ¯rst assume the gambling
e®ect model and derive the preference conditions. Weak ordering is immediate, and
gambling independence follows from the expected utility representation on R. We ¯-
nally demonstrate the Archimedean axiom. Part (i) follows from linearity of expected
utility on R and by taking ¸ and ¹ su±ciently small. Part (iii) follows because < has
a real-valued representation, v, on C (Fishburn 1970). Finally, we turn to part (ii).
If, for some outcome x, x Â S for all risky lotteries S, then v(x) provides an upper
bound for u, implying that ¹ in (i) can be chosen independently from P . The case
of an x inferior to all risky lotteries is treated similarly, now with v(x) a lower bound
for u. All preference conditions have been satis¯ed.
We next assume the preference conditions and derive the gambling model e®ect.
On R all preference axioms of expected utility are satis¯ed and hence an expected
utility representation can be obtained there, with the utility function denoted u. This
is proved by Fishburn (1980, p. 438). We brie°y sketch the proof. R is a mixture set
on which weak ordering, independence, and the appropriate Archimedean axiom (our
Part (i) only for risky Q) imply a linear representation by Fishburn (1970, Theorem
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8.4). Although no outcomes are contained in R, it is still possible to de¯ne u on
the outcomes such that the linear functional is expected utility with respect to u.











z for any risky lottery P . The results of Fishburn (1980 p. 438) as well
as the indi®erence just written imply that u is unique up to scale and location.
Outcomes x such that x Â P for all P 2R are called superior outcomes, outcomes
x such that x Á P for all P 2 R are called inferior outcomes. We ¯rst extend the
evaluation to outcomes that are neither superior nor inferior. For these outcomes,
there exist risky lotteries P;Q such that P < x < Q. It can be derived from (i)
of the Archimedean axiom that there exists a risky lottery R indi®erent to x. This
reasoning is similar to Fishburn (1970, C2 in Theorem 8.3). In short, if neither
P nor Q can play the role of R, then it follows from gambling independence that
f¸2 [0; 1] : ¸P + (1 ¡ ¸)Q Â xg is convex, and from (i) of the Archimedean axiom
that it is of the form (¹; 1]. Similarly, f¸2 [0; 1] : ¸P + (1¡ ¸)Q Á xg is of the form
[0; º). It then follows that R = ¹P + (1 ¡ ¹)Q can be taken (it can also be seen
that ¹ = º). We de¯ne v(x) as the expected utility of R. This is the only de¯nition
of v possible, given u. We have now established the gambling e®ect model, and its
uniqueness, on the union of all risky lotteries and all outcomes that are neither inferior
nor superior.
Next we consider superior and inferior outcomes. Let there exist a superior out-
come x. Then u must be bounded above, due to (ii) of the Archimedean axiom. To
wit, assume that u is not constant. Then we can take two risky lotteries Q;R with
Q Â R. Assume there is a risky P with P Â Q, if such P does not exist then u is
bounded and we are done. Take ¹ as in (ii) of the Archimedean axiom. Writing EU
for expected utility, it follows that ¹EU (P ) < EU(Q)¡ (1¡ ¹)EU(R) which pro-
vides an upper bound to EU(P ) and thus u must be bounded from above. Similarly,
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if there exist inferior outcomes, then u must be bounded from below. By part (iii)
of the Archimedean axiom and Fishburn (1970), there exists a function v¤ on C that
represents < on C. On the superior outcomes, we must and can let v be any ordinal
transform of v¤ that exceeds the upper bound of u, on the inferior outcomes we must
and can let v be any ordinal transform of v¤ that is below the lower bound of u. This
establishes the gambling e®ect model and also the uniqueness results of Observation
5. ¤
Proof of Observation 6.
First assume ordinal equivalence of u and v. Assume that we replace a positive-
probability outcome in a lottery by a strictly preferred outcome in such a manner
that the lottery is risky both before and after the substitution. It means that we have
replaced the outcome by one with a strictly higher v value, hence, by ordinal equiv-
alence, by one with a strictly higher u value. Given positiveness of the probability,
the replacement strictly increases the expected utility of the lottery, hence its pref-
erence value. A similar reasoning applies if we replace an outcome by an indi®erent
outcome, or by a strictly dispreferred outcome. From this and weak ordering, gamble
monotonicity follows.
Next assume that gamble monotonicity holds. Consider two outcomes x; y with
v(x) > v(y). This implies x Â y. Let P be any risky lottery. By gamble monotonicity,
0:5x + 0:5P Â 0:5y + 0:5P . Substitution of expected utility implies u(x) > u(y).
Similarly, v(x) = v(y) implies u(x) = u(y) and v(x) < v(y) implies u(x) < u(y). That
is, v and u are ordinally equivalent. Notice that in this step we only used gamble
monotonicity with ¸ = 0:5, hence it would have su±ced to require the condition only
for that ¸. This was actually the formulation used by Fishburn (1980, Axiom A2a).
¤
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Proof of Observation 7.
It is obvious that expected utility implies stochastic dominance. Hence we assume
stochastic dominance and the gambling e®ect model, and derive expected utility.
Claim 1. If for outcome x, there exists an outcome y Â x, then v(x)  u(x).
Proof. Consider a lottery (p; y; 1 ¡ p; x). By stochastic dominance, the lottery is
preferred to x, hence its expected utility exceeds v(x). For p tending to zero, the
expected utility tends to u(x), hence u(x) exceeds v(x). QED
Similarly it can be demonstrated that:
Claim 2. If for outcome x, there exists an outcome y Á x, then v(x) ¸ u(x).
The two claims show that u(x) = v(x) for all outcomes x, except best or worst
outcomes. Consider now a best outcome x. To avoid triviality we assume two non-
indi®erent outcomes, hence, by Claim 2, v(x) ¸ u(x). If v(x) > u(x), then we can
simply rede¯ne v(x) = u(x) and v(y) = u(y) for all outcomes y » x. This de¯nition
leads to correct descriptions of all preferences with x involved. We have strict prefer-
ence and stictly higher value for x than for each lottery assigning positive probability
to any outcome strictly worse than x. We have indi®erence and equal value for x
and each lottery assigning probability 1 to outcomes indi®erent to x. Similarly, for a
worst outcome y we can rede¯ne v(y) = u(y). ¤
Proof of Theorem 8.
Some explanation was already given above the theorem. Necessity of the pref-
erence conditions follows from substitution. For su±ciency, assume the preference
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conditions. Take y as assumed in the theorem. De¯ne ° = c(y). On the set of
nonsuperior and noninferior outcomes x, c(x) = ° follows from condition (ii) and
substitution. De¯ne v¤ = u+ °, also for superior and inferior outcomes.
If x is superior then condition (iii) ensures that v(x) > EU (P ) for all lotteries. If
x is inferior then condition (iv) ensures that v(x) < EU(P ) for all lotteries. Now the
representation accommodates all preferences. ¤
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